This paper deals with anaphoric properties of both pronominal and nonpronominal Noun Phrases within the framework of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT). A generalized notion of anaphora is advocated, in which the notion of anaphora is extended to cover relations between anaphor and antecedent other than referential identity. This paper tries to make insights gained in DRT, as well as in other theories of anaphora, applicable to a wide range of 'new' phenomena in the area of context dependent interpretation.
INTRODUCTION
Anaphoric reference has always been a busy area of linguistic research. Traditionally, theories of anaphora have concentrated on situations in which the anaphoric element is a definite Noun Phrase, most often a pronoun. Accordingly, the relation between anaphor and antecedent was construed as a relation of identity, an anaphor and its antecedent were, loosely speaking, considered to stand in a relation of conference. ' Gradually, however, a shift in perspective has arisen. Especially since the 1970s, questions of text coherence have come into focus (e.g. Clark & Havilarid 1977; see Carter 1987 for an overview) in artificial intelligence as well as in psycholinguistics and, along with this new perspective, pronominal anaphora has come to be viewed as merely one symptom of text cohesion (Halliday & Hasan 1976) , rather than as an isolated phenomenon. The cohesive viewpoint was given a linguistic follow-up in the work of Grosz (1977) and Sidner (1983) , among others. Sidner, for instance, viewed anaphora primarily as a way to keep hold of the focus of a text. Now in this wider perspective of text-cohesion, the restriction to 'identity anaphora' has little to commend itself. For example, consider the following text (cf. Heim 1982):
(1) John read A BOOK ABOUT SCHUBERT. He wrote a letter to THE AUTHOR. 2 If the pronoun he is anaphoric because its interpretation (i.e. its reference) depends on the cohesion between the two sentences, then why should not the author be anaphoric for the same reason? In cases such as this, where the anaphoric relationship does not depend on equality of anaphor and antecedent, Somewhat more controversially, we would claim that even proper names can be anaphoric (cf. Weijters 1989) . For even though a proper name can sometimes 4 introduce a previously unknown entity, the more common situation seems to be that a proper name selects an entity from an earlier introduced set. Consider (3) Yesterday, PSV had great difficulty in winning the cup final. Only five minutes before the end of the match against FC Utrecht, KIEFT scored the winning goal. (Weijters 1989) Weijters notes that even readers who have not the slightest idea which players are in the PSV team, are able to deduce on the basis of (3) that Kieft is one of them. Henceforth, we will, lacking evidence to the contrary, assume that all NPs can be anaphoric. Although subsequent treatments have expanded the work of Sidner, 5 they inherit its main weaknesses. In order to arrive at a comprehensive and explicit treatment of anaphoric phenomena, and to formulate and explain adequate restrictions, we will sketch an account of generalized anaphora along the lines of Kamp's Discourse Representation Theory (DRT; Kamp 1981) . 6 As a result, further justification is provided for the idea that there is one notion of generalized anaphora which applies to pronouns and definite descriptions as well as other Noun Phrases, and possibly even to other categories-and also for the idea that the mechanism of DRT is powerful enough to account for this broad area of anaphoric phenomena.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we will investigate the structural constraints on full NP anaphora. In section 3, a simple variety of DRT that deals with singular and plural NPs is sketched. In section 4, our own proposal for the treatment of anaphoric full NPs is presented. In section 5, possible extensions of our proposal are briefly discussed, such as the extension to categories other than the Noun Phrase. Throughout, familiarity with existing theories of anaphora will be taken for granted except for some brief explanatory remarks. The basic technicalities of Generalized Quantifier theory are explained in a technical Appendix.
CONSTRAINTS ON FULL NP ANAPHORA
Much of the effort in modern anaphora research has gone into finding structural constraints on the anaphoric relation. For instance, the tradition that has originated from Reinhart (1976) has formulated syntactic constraints on the coreference relation, and the accessibility constraints in DRT serve a similar purpose. Which of all the traditional constraints carry over to full NP anaphora? Some time ago, H. Lasnik conjectured that all do: The correct generalization appears to be that in any structural configuration in which coreference between two NPs is precluded, overlap in reference is also precluded' (Lasnik 1976) .
However, this is not exactly what we find. The deviations from Lasnik's conjecture are most clear in the case of Reinhart's constraints on anaphora. Let us, for the moment, stick to entrenched (pre-Reinhart 1983a) terminology. As is well known, the Disjoint Reference Rule (DRR) forbids that a non-reflexive anaphor has an antecedent within its 'minimal governing category', a specified syntactic domain that may be simplified, for current purposes, to be the S or NP node most immediately dominating the anaphor. (See, for instance, Reinhart 1983b for details.) Now this rule fails to hold in the new situation. For example, DRR is violated in (4) THE LEFT envisaged A NEW FOOTHOLD, if we interpret the footliold as an anaphor, namely as a foothold for the Left. For in this case, no S or NP node separates the anaphor and the antecedent. Likewise, the Noncoreference Rule (NCR) is violated in the sentence (5) A FEW SPECIMENS were enough to conclude that ALL PAPERS were censured, for NCR enforces noncoreference between a nonpronominal NP and any c-commanding NP, whereas in (5), the specimens c-command the papers. However, the non-application of these rules in the area of full NP anaphora can be understood if one takes the pragmatic viewpoint of Reinhart 1983a where there is, within the broader area of coreference, one preferred relationship between a pronoun and an NP, namely the binding relationship. Binding implies a c-command relation as well as a few other structural requirements. Now Reinhart's central idea-in the style of Grice's axiom of Manner-is that deviations from this preferred situation ought to be motivated. In other words, a Preference for Binding principle ('Preference Principle', for short) is in force which says:
Preference Principle: Whenever a sentence is uttered in which two NPs fail to stand in the binding relation, whereas a minor change in wording (without a change in meaning) would have resulted in a binding situation, then the two NPs are not intended to corefer.
This principle, together with a definition of binding, replaces specific rules such as NCR and DRR. To start with DRR, structural rules say that (6)(a) is a case of binding, while (6)(b) is not:
(6)(a) ZELDA bores HERSELF. (6)(b) ZELDA bores HER.
Therefore, if a speaker utters (b), he or she 'avoids' the binding variant (a), and consequently no coreference between Zelda and her is intended. This reasoning applies to full NPs with the same cogency. For instance, the Preference Principle forbids full NP anaphora in (7): (7) ZELDA bores THE WOMAN, for it is plausible that the woman can be replaced by the pronoun her without a change in meaning. The application of the principle to NCR is analogous, and can, in principle, also be applied to full NPs. For instance, anaphora in (8) The SOLDIER thinks that THE OFFICER is competent is forbidden, since replacement of the officer by he results in binding. By contrast, coreference in (9) is allowed, (9) As HERODOTUS had to be in Athens by nightfall, THE HISTORIAN had to hurry up (example from Van Eijck, personal communication) .
for replacement of one of the two NPs by a pronoun can never result in binding, since neither NP c-commands the other. We think that these predictions are borne out by the facts. However, the (real or purported) full NP anaphors in (7), (8) and (9) are all of a special kind: they are identity anaphors. It is easy to see that the applicability of the Preference Principle, and therefore also the validity of DRR and NCR, is limited to identity anaphora. For replacement of an anaphoric full NP by a pronoun will always change meaning-so that the Preference Principle cannot apply-except when we happen to deal with identity anaphora. This explains why (4) and (5) violate constraints on coreference. For instance, a newfoothold in (4) cannot without a change in meaning be replaced by itself, neither can a few specimens in (5) be replaced by they.
The situation for the DRT constraints on anaphora is even subtler. As is well known, Kamp (1981) predicts that quantifying NPs create anaphoric 'islands' that are inaccessible for anaphors outside the NP. Now full NP anaphors violate this constraint, but plurals do so as well. While anaphoric readings are impossible in (io)(a), anaphoric readings of (io)(b) and (c) seem acceptable. We will see later how slight modifications in DRT predict precisely this pattern of observations.
Another central tenet of DRT is the novelty constraint on indefinites. DRT makes indefinite NPs the mirror image of definite NPs: while definite NPs must always be anaphoric, indefinites can never be anaphoric. Indefinite NPs introduce new material-encoded in a so-called Reference Marker (RM)-and this material can be referred to by a subsequent definite NP. This idea cannot be upheld without modification, however, since indefinite NPs can be anaphoric in our sense of the word, as we have seen.
9 Yet, it is true that indefinites cannot normally have identity anaphora. For instance, the indicated reading of (i i) is ungrammatical:
(i i) THE MAN walks; A MAN talks.
However, one need not describe this as a residual novelty constraint on indefinites; for although an indefinite anaphor cannot pick up an antecedent as a whole, neither can a non-anaphoric indefinite NP of the form DET CN (a Determiner followed by a Common Noun) be used to denote the entire set {X| \CN\\ Q X}. Both phenomena can be explained along the lines of Horn's scalar implicatures (Horn 1972) . For example, according to Horn, all is stronger than some, and therefore the sentence Some people walk has the scalar implicature that it is not true that All people walk. In Gricean terms, the strongest determiner is always preferred. Now, assuming that the is stronger than a , 10 it follows that a square of 5 equals 25 is awkward, given that it is also true that the square of 5 equals 25. Likewise, in (11), an anaphoric reading of a man talks is awkward, since it must also be true on this reading that the man talks. In combination with a Russellian analysis of definiteness, indefinites have nonuniqueness as an implicature. The impossibility of indefinite identity anaphora follows immediately from this proposition.
To sum up, the current tendency towards pragmatic explanation of structural constraints is confirmed by our findings in the area of NP anaphora. For both the novelty constraint for indefinites and the limitations of c-command constraints can be reduced to pragmatic laws.
A SIMPLE THEORY OF SINGULAR AND PLURAL NPS
Given that our proposals in the area of anaphoric NPs come on top of a DRTbased semantics for non-anaphoric NPs, and since our account will include plural NPs, a variant of DRT has to be adopted that included plural NPs. So far, however, no definitive treatment for plurals has been forthcoming. We will keep matters simple and stay away from such complexities as are involved in the treatment of mass NPs (Link 1983) , conjoined NPs (e.g. van Eijck 1983) and intensionality (Landman 1989 ). Instead, we will rely on a simple theory of plurality that combines some useful features of Roberts (1987) and van Eijck (I983)-A good starting point to explain our own proposal is the treatment put forward in Roberts (1987) . Roberts extrapolates Kamp's distinction between quanrificational and other NPs to the realm of plural NPs, calling an NP individual denoting (ID, for short) if it can have a collective reading, and quantificational otherwise. Normally, ID NPs are read collectively, but if an implicit or explicit adverbial operator ('each') intervenes, diey are interpreted individually. In the latter case, they are treated on the same pattern as quantifying NPs. In this way, the commonalities between distributive ID NPs and quantifying NPs are adequately reflected. For instance, Roberts' theory explains why the distributive reading of (12) The men lifted a piano cannot precede It was heavy, since the Reference Marker that is introduced by the NP a piano-which appears quantified now-is inaccessible to discourse anaphors in a subsequent sentence. These features of her proposal will be used in our own account, but other aspects will be left aside. In particular, we will use sets rather like lattices, as Roberts does. More crucially, we will replace conditions of the form CN(X) (meaning X Q \\CNf) by conditions in the Generalized Quantifier format NP(X) (cf. van Eijck 1983) , primarily because our treatment of anaphoric full NPs in section 4 needs to have all NP information available in one condition. 11 The resulting representation for (12) runs as depicted in Figure 1 . Note that the RM y ranges over individuals, while X and Z range over sets. The condition The men (X)' can be glossed 'X contains all the men in the universe of discourse, but nothing else'. In general, DET CN(X) holds if X contains DET elements of \\CN\\, and nothing else. This informal characterization will be made precise below. 
Figure 1
Finally, we want to allow discourse anaphora to quantifying NPs, but only for plural pronouns and for nonpronominal NPs (section 2). Therefore, quantificational NPs introduce a quantified individual RM and a set RM in the principal DRS. Roberts's conditional structure bi => DET =* &2, which took a different value for each determiner, is replaced by Kamp's bi =* &2 (i.e. b 1 =» EVERY => b2). For example, the sentence Many men walked is represented in Figure 2 . Thus we arrive at the following DRS construction rule, that applies to both singular and plural NPs: i2 (Here <f> [rp: -x] abbreviates the result of substitution of x for ip in the condition ^.) To illustrate the intended meaning of conditions of the form a (X), consider (13) Some men lifted a piano, and more specifically the condition 'Some men (X)' in its representation. X has to fulfil two requirements: the standard GQ condition \{some men)\\(X)-meaning that X contains some men and any number of other objects in addition-and the requirement that X contains only men. For if the men were assisted by any number of gorillas, their athletic accomplishment cannot be reported by the quoted sentence. 13 Therefore, we will follow Van Eijck in defining
However, in this clause, the meaning of NP(X) is specified not in terms of the meanings of NP and of X, but in terms of the meanings of Det, CN and X. This departure from compositionality becomes a drawback in the case of syntactically simplex NPs (e.g. all in the sense of all people, who, proper names, pronouns). To remedy this defect, we will use the smallest witness set (Thijsse 1985) of an NP denotation (abbreviated: K(\\NP\\)) as a proxy for the CN denotation (Appendix, ii.). Therefore, a slightly more general version of the definition runs:
Thus, if NP, is simplex and NP 2 complex, and both denote the same quantifier (for instance, NP, = many and NP 2 -many people), then both NP,(X) and NP 2 (X) are restricted to the CN-denotation of NP 2 . This a priori plausible prediction seems to be borne out by the facts.
14 Consequendy, the smallest witness set can be used both for complex and for simplex NPs.
The treatment that we have outlined in the present section is basically rich enough to serve the purposes of this paper, although a number of additions are needed to make it fully adequate. In particular, provisions are needed to deal with NPs other than those which are monotonically increasing (see van Eijck 1983 and Appendix, iv.) and in order to deal with unbound anaphora to indefinites (Evans 1977; van Eijck 1983; van Deemter 1989) .
A TREATMENT OF FULL NP ANAPHORA WITHIN DRT
Imagine a sign in a supermarket saying ALL PRICES REDUCED. This is not naturally taken to concern all prices of all commodities in the world. Rather, the domain of the statement may be restricted to prices in the supermarket. Only a small part of the world functions as the domain of our utterances, a different part on each occasion. In cases such as this-cases of full NP deixis-the domain is restricted by the utterance situation. In the case of full NP anaphora, it is the linguistic situation that causes the restriction. We can apply this idea to DRT by interpreting conditions relative to the temporary domains that are provided by antecedent RMs. The default domain, so to speak, is the normal universe-ofdiscourse of the model, but during processing different domains become active. Anaphoric resolution becomes the problem of finding the right domain. If one NP is anaphoric to another, their respective RMs stand in a certain relation. Which relations qualify? First, there are highly general relations such as the relation ofsubsumption (subset of a set, part of a quantity, substructure of a given structure). Presumably, this relation is so basic that it can be exploited without mention: speaking about a crowd, the NP the men can be understood as denoting the men in the crowd without explicit mention of the subset relation. The same thing may hold for a few other, highly general relations such as the relation between cause and effect. For simplicity, we will assume that all relations other than the relation of subsumption (for us mostly: the subset relation) can only be activated by the use of certain so-called/wncfion nouns. For instance, although all articles have authors, the NP the people in (14) THE ARTICLES were interesting, THE PEOPLE really liked them.
cannot denote the authors of the articles. In order to refer to these, the relevant relation ('author-of) must be indicated by means of the function noun author:
(i 5) THE ARTICLES were quite long, THE AUTHORS really liked them.
Whenever this is the case, we will speak of relational anaphora. I will sketch a treatment for relational anaphora in section 4.2, after concentrating first on subsectional anaphora (section 4.1). In section 4.3, we will adress the resolution problem for full NPs and reflect briefly upon the validity of familiarity based theories of definiteness.
Subsectional anaphora
How can our ideas concerning the interpretation of conditions relative to shifting domains be implemented within the theory of section 3 ? Given this set RM-based framework, context-dependent interpretation of conditions of the form NP(X) is crucial, so we will concentrate on relativization of these conditions. 15 We stipulate that a condition of the form NP(X) can be relativized to any accessible RM Y, written NP Y (X). Conditions of this form are interpreted roughly along the lines of Westerstahl (1985) , who interprets conditions of the form ||Drf|| Y (||CN|D(X) as meaning ||Drt||(C3Vj r> Y)(X). For Westerstahl, Y is a set variable to be instantiated by a 'context set', which is somehow provided by the context. 16 It is roughly a Westerstahl-style 'Generalized Quantifier plus relativizations' theory that we want to add to DRT, in order to combine the virtues of both theories. In particular, DRT contributes its anaphoric mechanism to instantiate Westerstahl's variable over context sets. Suppose an earlier sentence has given rise to an antecedent RM Y, denoting a set of policemen, for instance, then the sentence Two tough guys smashed the door may lead to dae representation in Figure 3 , where the anaphoric link between the tough guys and the policemen is reflected by the relativized condition (2 tough guys) Y (X). As a result, DRT's predictions about possible pronounantecedent pairs will be inherited by full NP anaphors. This idea will be made more precise in the next sections. The most direct way to combine Westerstahl's relativized NP conditions with DRT is to define interpretations of such conditions in the following way:
The last conjunct incorporates Westerstahl's basic idea. 17 The second conjunct is needed for the same reason as the corresponding clause in Set Predication (cf. section 3). Further, we will assume that The men lifted a piano is false with respect to a domain Y, not only if the men were assisted by gorillas (cf. section 3), but also if diey were assisted by men outside Y. This is why we require/(X) Qf(Y).
Sometimes, it follows automatically that f(Y) -f(X). For example, in
(16) A HUNDRED POLICE OFFICEHS went in. THE MEN/THE BASTARDS ruined everything, it is predicted that the men among the officers ruined everything; but if all the officers happen to be men (bastards), then all the officers are to be blamed, of course. So identity anaphora comes out as a special case of subsectional anaphora. Unaccented use of an NP induces identity anaphora. For instance, if the men is unaccented in speech, it will tend to be interpreted as denoting the entire set of officers. Reversely, an accented occurrence may either denote a subset of die officers, or a different set altogether. This fits the well-known rule that new information is accented in speech (Halliday 1967) , provided that a real part of a given set counts as new information. Technically, this direct accommodation of Westerstahl's idea is not completely satisfactory yet. Not only is the compositional formulation of subsectional relativization-in which the determiner interpretation is recovered from the NP denotation-problematic in view of syntactically simple NPs such as all and many, but since we want to treat proper names and pronouns in the same way as other NPs, their treatment will become problematic also. Worse, Westerstahl's approach is limited to Noun Phrases, offering little promise for the relativization of Verb Phrases, Adjectives, etc. (section 5). Therefore, we turn to relativizations in a more directly logical sense. A semantic definition of the relativization of a formula <f> to a set A runs Here we assume that M is a model (£, /), where E is the universe of the model, and I the interpretation function. M \ A (the restriction of M to A) is defined as (E^ A, I'), where for n-ary relations R, I'(R) -I(R) n A". Finally, the treatment of free variables requires a slightly more complex version of relativization:
HeieffA is defined as follows: for arbitrary Z and x, where Z is a variable over sets and x a variable over individuals,
Now that we have made relativization precise, we propose the following modification of the verification clause for relativized conditions, which is-in a sense to be made precise in the Appendix (Appendix, iii.)-'as compositional as possible':
The last conjunct can be expanded:
To illustrate, take the sentence All people shouted, where the NP all people is anaphoric to the RM Y. Let the universe E of M equal {a, b, c, d}, while f(Y) -{b,c,d};nowi{yeople\\ -{a, b,c}, then\\all people^ -{{a, b,c},[a, b,c, d}}, and \\allpeople^, f^y saying that models may be decreased without loss of truth. Now, since Kamp (1981) , an asymmetry comes to •the fore: our full NPs introduce RMs, but Kamp's pronouns only pick up old RMs. Symmetry is restored if we let pronouns, too, introduce RMs (see also Kamp 1985) and add conditions of the form pronoun (RM). Given suitable pronoun meanings, relativization of pronoun(RM) to a different RM will amount to equality of the two RMs. To illustrate: assume that the RM Y is an available antecedent in the DRS, then the sentence They were angry is represented as shown in Figure 4 . The meaning |T/iey|| has to guarantee that 18 Here, we opt for an approach in which both features are part of the semantic content, in order to account for the fact that certain violations of number agreement are semantically impossible, while other violations can be grammatically acceptable. For example, our account predicts that the indicated reading of (i7)(a) is ungrammatical on semantic grounds, while (i7)(b) is left unaffected:
(i7)(a) TWO BOYS want a moped, HE likes to show off. (i7)(b) EVERY BOY wants a moped, THEY like to show off.
It is plausible that, in addition to these semantic constraints on the number of a pronoun, there is a pragmatic-and therefore 'defeasible'-tendency towards complete number agreement between pronoun and antecedent, especially in the case of bound anaphora ( van Eijck 1983) . A possible semantics for the English plural pronoun runs
\they\-[Z:Z -E &\E\> 2).
As a result, they Y (X) implies the familiar DRT condition X -Y; for Subsectional Relativization species that^X £/Y, and the clause Kf/jf^X))*! guarantees that/Y £_/X, as one may easily verify, the meaning of we must be slightly more complex:
As a result, the relativized condition We y (X) is true iff Speaker e X -YC ||/4nmid/e|| and |X| > 2. The pronoun he may, if we simplify," denote either \he\jj, if it is taken to stand in the relation of identity to its antecedent, or, it may denote ||/ie |[, ub , if it is used subsectionally:
In the case of lhe\\i d , a relativized condition he Y (X) requires that Y equals the singleton X, while in the case of ||/ie|| Jub , Y consists of the only male entity in the possibly larger set X. According to this 'new information' reading, an NP the married couple can be antecedent to the anaphor he, which will now denote the male element of the couple. What counts is that, in the standard case where X is a singleton, the result is equivalent to the traditional DRT account,whereas the procedure followed is the same as the one proposed for full NPs.. This concludes our treatment of the semantics of subsectional full NP anaphora. As we have seen, identity anaphora comes out as a special case of a more general notion of anaphora. Our account makes it also plausible that definite descriptions can have identity anaphora by accident, while with pronouns, identify follows from descriptive poverty.
20 Now we will return briefly to relational anaphora.
Relational anaphora
Relational NPs can be accommodated in our account of full NP anaphora by means of a mechanism of indirect relativization. Consider a relational NP such as the mother, two mothers, then die intended set of mothers can be restricted through a restriction of the set of their children. In order to make this idea precise, some notation is needed. Assume CN is relational; now if CN X stands for the 'normal' meaning [x\ 3 y:CN 2 (x, y)}, where CN 2 denotes the relation involved in the CN, we propose the notation CN^ for the 'relational', or indirect relativization of CN,: = [m\ 3 XE y(CN 2 (»j, *))}. In particular, for the condition to be true, X must contain the unique sheep that is a mother of a number of lambs in the set Y, and X may contain nothing more. The indefinite NP Two mothers is treated analogously, with X containing two sheep that are mothers of lambs in Y. As stipulated in the introduction of section 4, this treatment is restricted to NPs containing a recognizably relational CN (such as mother, daughter, example). In all other cases, our approach forces us to construe the anaphoric relation as a variety of the subsumption relation. Sometimes this may lead to a rather strained analysis. For instance, the anaphoric relation in such notoriously problematic cases as (io)(a) When we arrived in THE VILLAGE, SEVERAL HOUSES were abandoned. (io)(b) MY DESK is a mess, MANY PAPERS are covered under cigar-ash.
must be construed as a subsumption relation of some kind, since no overt relational element connects the houses with the village or the papers with the desk. In the final analysis, a more liberal approach that allows a wider range of 'associative' anaphoric relations may turn out to be most appropriate. In section 5, we will briefly discuss an approach that would make possible an alternative ('situation anaphora') solution to pieces of discourse such as (io)(a) and (b). But first we have some remarks about the resolution problem for (subsectional or relational) full NP anaphora.
Resolution and the familiarity condition
We have seen that a suitably extended version of DRT can be used to derive anaphoric readings for full NPs. In order to choose the intended reading, the same resolution strategies can be used as for pronominal anaphors (e.g. Sidner 1983; Carter 1987) . However, the descriptive information in full NPs-which is, as we have seen, not fundamentally different from, but much richer than the number and gender information in pronouns-can constrain the set of possible antecedents drastically. Suppose the set of worlds W encodes the Common The description the son of... can relate to the film director, even though nothing is known about him. 22 Further, the Resolution Constraint is merely a constraint, not a sufficient condition. Other constraints, of a pragmatic nature, are suggested by Maes. For instance, the description in (20) is adequate, according to Maes, in so far as it can count as an explanation for the director's predilection.
To exemplify the Resolution Constraint, suppose a discourse has led to the introduction of an RM Y, the non-singleton set of prisoners in a penitentiary institution. Let -• abbreviate 'can take as its subsectional antecedent'; then if we assume that Reinhart's constraints are fulfilled and that Y is accessible, our theory predicts that a. the old sailor -Y if, in at least one w e W, there is exactly one old sailor among the prisoners. b. an old sailor -* Y if, in at least one w e W, there is at least one old sailor among the prisoners.
This example is worth reflecting upon, for it brings out that all the differences between definites and indefinites are accounted for by a Russellian 'uniqueness' analysis of descriptions (Russell 1905 ) plus a Hornian theory of scalar implicatures (section 2). Otherwise, the two are treated equally. Where does this leave the principle offamiliarity (Christophersen 1939; Heim 1982) , here rendered as Heim's 'Extended Novelty-Familiarity-Gondition' (Heim 1982 (Maes forthcoming) . In effect, our approach vindicates a unicity account (Kadmon 1987) of definiteness. However, we do not think that the property of'having an anaphoric reading' is a consequence of unicity, as Kadmon claims, since diis is a property that is shared by all NPs, as we have stressed throughout this paper, while unicity is not.
Of course, part (i) of Heim's familiarity condition remains valid for identity anaphora and part (ii) remains valid for pronouns, so a weakened version of the familiarity principle can easily be formulated. However, no separate statement of the principle is needed since this weakened version follows from independent semantic and pragmatic principles, as we have seen.
CONCLUSION: THE BOUNDS OF ANAPHORA
In the introduction of this paper, we promised a theory of 'generalized anaphora'. In the sequel of this paper, we have somewhat discourteously stretched the time-honoured notion of anaphora to cover so-called subsectional cases of anaphora (as in sentence (2), for example) and we have even tried to apply it-even more controversially-to relational Noun Phrases (as in sentence (1)). We hope to have demonstrated how theories that were designed to tackle problems in the area of pronominal anaphora can be used to deal with very similar problems in areas that are traditionally unrelated to anaphora. Thus, the notion of anaphora and many notions that are related to it (antecedent, accessibility, resolution, etc.) were generalized considerably. Yet this article has at best provided a very partial answer to the question of how general a phenomenon anaphora really is. We will not attempt a definition of generalized anaphora in this paper. 24 Instead, some possible extensions of the theory beyond the topics of the previous sections will briefly be pointed out below. As ever, the contrastive sense-in which the speaker, tired of all the slow horses in V, demands two really fast horses-requires contrastive intonation (Halliday 1967) . This example suggests that the role of comparison sets in the interpretation of vague adjectives (Klein 1979 ) might be integrated in a theory of generalized anaphora by identifying comparison sets with anaphoric antecedents.
Other categories. It seems that some degree of extrapolation to categories other than the Noun Phrase is justifiable as well. For example, consider VPs. There are relational verbs, such as stop or continue, that can be viewed as inherently anaphoric to a VP describing an activity. On an anaphoric reading of stopped in (21) The computer WAS RUNNING THE PROGRAM but suddenly it STOPPED, the computer might go on running other programs; it stops running the one program mentioned in the text. An example of a subsectionally interpreted VP would be (22) Mary went SWIMMING but after a while she stopped EXERTING HERSELF, which has a reading according to which Mary stopped swimming, leaving it open whether she continued doing other exerting things.
The sentence may also be a legitimate category for anaphora. In this case, antecedent RMs would denote entire situations (places, times, worlds). For instance, in (23) The crowd gathered in front of the castle. Only one man carried a key, one understands typically that the man carried the key at the time of the gathering. A similar view was taken, among others, by B. Partee, who showed how an anaphoric mechanism could account for a number of facts in the area of temporal reference. This idea can be accommodated in the account of section 4 if domain dynamics is replaced by time dynamics. Interestingly, neither subsumption nor equality are the default anaphoric relations in this application of the anaphoric perspective. Rather, the default anaphoric relation is the relation of immediate succession; all other relations, including equality of time, have to be enforced, as Partee shows.
Let us conclude. To hypothesize that context-dependent interpretation will be an increasingly important aspect of future semantic theories seems a safe bet. Theories of anaphora have proved their usefulness as a tool in a considerable part of this area, far beyond the facts they were originally designed to explain. How much further they will finally reign remains to be seen.
6 APPENDIX: TERMINOLOGY AND SOME RESULTS FROM GQ-THEORY i. Constraints on generalized quantifiers. It is a crucial observation of Generalized Quantifier (GQ) theory that natural language NP denotations, viewed as sets of properties (Montague 1973) (equivalently: relations between properties), observe certain semantic constraints (Barwise & Cooper 1981; van Benthem 1984) . In particular, the truth of a relation QAB, where Q denotes the relation and A and B are subsets of the universe E may ( iii. Nonrecoverability of Q from QA. Conversely, the determiner denotation cannot be recovered from an NP denotation. This negative result can be proved simply, as Thijsse (1983) shows: suppose E is the universe of discourse, and take Qi -\\Two\\ and Q 2 = |/4//||, while \A\ = 2. Then (relative to E) Q t A = Q 2 A -{X Q E: AQ X], but the two determiner denotations are different. Note that the very same example also goes to show that not all NPs are model anti-persistent (and consequently, not all NPs are R-stable); for although Q,^4 = Q 2 A relative to E, the equality is easily destroyed through relativization. Consequently, the denotation of a relativized condition NP X is not a function of the denotations of NP and X. This is reflected in our own definition of 'f verifies NP X (Y)', which defines the meaning of an expression in a given model M in terms of a different model M F X. No strictly compositional verification clause is possible, unless the model becomes part of the meaning: iNf*^equals the function A, such that
iv. Adequacy of the set-RM account of NP semantics. We have limited the way in which NPs introduce set RMs-basically borrowed from van Eijck (1983)-explicitly to monotonically increasing NPs. This can be argued as follows: call a quantifier QA directly DR-representable (DR) if all its elements are 'grouped around' a number of witness sets:
It is easy to see that, given DRT's embedding apparatus, quantifiers which are DR are representable in the box notation exemplified above. But direct representability is coextensive with upward monotonicity in the right argument.
Theorem 2 (given Conservativity): QA is DR <» QA is monotonically increasing ( -t). Proof: The left-to-right implication is straightforward. For the other direction, suppose QA is -t. Then (1) if QAB then 3XQA(XeQA 8cXQB) (take X: -A n B and use Conservativity); and (2) if 3 X c A(Xe QA & X c B), then X e QA, and therefore also B e QA, due to the left-to-right implication.
Consequently, monotonically increasing NPs, such as every, or more than n are unproblematic. A monotonically decreasing NP can be 'reanalysed' as the negation of a monotonically increasing one ( van Eijck 1983) . Moreover, if we assume Continuity (see above), then all NPs can be reanalysed as conjunctions of the earlier resolved cases:
Theorem 3: A quantifier is continuous if and only if it is logically equivalent to a conjunction of one -t quantifier and one -I quantifier. (Thijsse 1983.) Consequently, all Continuous quantifiers are 'DR-representable via reanalysis'. 
Without the assumption of Extension, counterexamples against theorem 4 are easy to find. A case in point is the quantifier Q ('few') that is defined Q B AB ^D ef \A n B | ^ i/2\E |, which is I -but not R-stable. A Non-conservative counterexample is the quantifier Q, defined (for a given x): QAB ^D e f x 6 A V x $ B, which is R-stable but not I-. Here, total removal of objects from the model is innocuous, but removal of an object (the object x, in this case) from A alone can turn a true statement into a false one. Hirst (1981) and Carter (1987) . Carter, for instance, extends Sidner's approach to cover certain sorts of indefinite NPs. 6 We trust that our proposals can be incorporated in other 'context change' theories of anaphora, such as Groenendijk & Stokhof (1987) and Barwise (1985) . 7 The simplest and probably most viable definition says that a node OL c-commands (for 'constituent-commands') a node /J if and only if the node that immediately dominates OL dominates )3 as well. 8 See van Eijck (1983) for additional evidence for our position. 9 A case in point is the two sick elephants variety of example sentence (2). See also section 4.3. 10 This is a highly plausible assumption, since on a standard truth conditional analysis, the is logically stronger than a. 11 Although some anaphoric full NPs could be treated on the basis of a CN(X) format, this is not true for all NPs. For example, the identity between an anaphoric NP the men and an antecedent RM Y can be expressed by means of conditions (1) men(X) and (2) X -Y; but the subsectional anaphoric relation between the NP all men and Y cannot be expressed by a condition (1) men(X) and, for instance, (2) XQY. The CN(X) format works only for identity anaphora and for intersecrive NPs (Appendix, i.). 12 In this simplified construction rule, as also in van Eijck (1983) (Harman 1977) : 'A and B mutually know that p' °D ef q, where q is defined selfreferentially as 'A and B know that p and that q'.
22 The fact that the speaker must know that the descriptive content of the anaphor holds follows from a Gricean sincerity ('Quality') condition that is not particular to anaphora. 23 For instance, such definite descriptions as John's father and the weather need not be anaphoric, as Heim is well aware (Heim 1982: III.5.2) . Also relevant is the phenomenon of 'forward' (i.e. kataphoric) reference, in which an anaphor relates to an antecedent to its right. In such cases, even the familiarity of anaphoric (kataphoric) antecedents becomes problematic. See van Deemter (1990) for a discussion. 24 In particular, I feel that D. Carter's definition of anaphora (cf. the introduction of the present paper) is somewhat overly general in counting all cases of contextdependent meaning as anaphora. For instance, the well-known phenomenon of contextual disambiguation obviously involves context-dependent meaning, but seems to obey rules that are very different from those that govern the interpretation of pronouns. Similar reservations would apply to the inclusion of other context dependent phenomena such as gapping and VPdeletion. 25 Thanks are due to J. van Ben them for parts of this proof. A closely related theorem is proved in Thijsse (1983) .
